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Abstract
The global media is not limited to disseminating information but also plays
the role of fostering ideas, diffusing stories, and exchanging culture. The content
produced by global media, however, may be subject to different ownership
structures. The ways that different media ownership structures influence global
communication in both economic and political significance are therefore worth
exploring. This paper first introduces two types of global media ownership
structures—state-owned and privately owned—and cites specific examples to parse
how these two types of ownership structures may influence global communication
economically and politically. The paper then critically discusses issues of media
ownership concentration in western democracies.
Keywords: global communication; state-owned media; free media;
authoritarianism; ownership structure; ownership concentration
Global media is not limited only to disseminating information in modern
society but also plays the role of fostering ideas, diffusing stories, and exchanging
culture alongside technological developments and mass communication (Flew,
2018). The availability and accuracy of information are therefore of utmost
importance for the massive public, including voters, investors, consumers, and
executives, to make rational decisions on daily matters in modern economies and
societies. The content produced and diffused by global media may be subject to
different ownership structures, however (Hamelink, 2015). It is therefore important
to understand how different ownership structures of global media have influenced
global communication in both economic and political significance. This paper first
introduces two types of global media ownership structures—state-owned and
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privately owned—and cites specific examples to compare political and economic
impacts of these two types of ownership structures. The paper then critically
discusses media ownership concentration in western democracies. This paper
adopts the political-economy approach to consider the essential relationship
between power and wealth while analyzing media ownership structures and
employs egalitarian thinking to assess the inequality and social injustices caused by
ownership concentration.
Literature Review
State-owned media is fully controlled by the government financially and is
editorially at the government’s service, whereas privately owned media can be fully
owned by individuals or by private corporations distinctly for commercial
revenues. Moreover, governments may fund two noticeably different types of
media, which are state-owned media and public-service media. Most public-service
media, such as the BBC in the United Kingdom and the CBC in Canada, are directly
or indirectly funded by the government, with a few exceptions receiving funds from
foundations and businesses. Despite the financial tie with government, publicservice media enjoys independent editorial rights and serves the interests of the
general public. State-owned media, in comparison, is not only financially
dependent on the government but also strictly controlled by the state in both
financial decisions and editorial operations, thereby serving the interests of the state
(Webster, 1992). The state media discussed in this paper is state-owned media
rather than public-service media.
In the modern world, although state-owned media may be advantageous
over privately owned media economically, it undermines political and market
freedom by exploiting a nation’s soft power, controlling the flow of stories, and
manipulating information dissemination in global communication. Public interest
theory, established under the premise that governments maximize the welfare of
citizens, is notably the first media theory that compares the role of state-owned
media and private media in mass communication. According to this theory, stateowned media appear to be more favorable than privately owned media on several
grounds (Begoyan, 2009). First, information is a public good that is costly to keep
from unpaid groups if it has been distributed to paid consumers. Additionally, high
fixed costs and low marginal costs can be found in the media industry, as collecting
and distributing information are significantly expensive, while the cost of
reproducing can be relatively low. These two characteristics fundamentally
determine that the ownership of global media may be by either wealthy individuals

215

BUTLER JOURNAL OF UNDERGRADUATE RESEARCH, VOLUME 7

or the state. As a result, state-owned media may not only possess the economic
strength to distribute information but also be able to maintain the neutrality of the
information disseminated instead of serving the exclusive interest of a few wealthy
individual owners (Begoyan, 2009).
In contrast, public choice theory holds that state media are more likely to
distort information, manipulate public opinions, and preclude the public from
accessing facts in order to entrench the power of the incumbent ruling class while
private media tend to diversify public narrative by supplying alternative
perspectives, verify information authenticity by engaging in independent
investigation, and ultimately lead the general public to make informed decisions.
In addition, the control mechanism of the free market—open competition between
different private media—may also effectively ensure that the information circulated
is unbiased and carefully verified (Djankov et al., 2003). Admittedly, given the
public-good nature of information, state media may be better placed than private
media in economic significance. In reality, however, state-owned media may
ultimately undermine the free market and modern democracy because of the
coercive dominance of the government and the absence of independent editorial
accountability, while private media with market competition can sustain the checks
and balances of modern democracy and serve the general public with truthful
information.
In a study examining the media ownership structures of 97 countries,
researchers found ample evidence favoring the public choice theory; no empirical
evidence has been established to support the public interest theory. The research
found that a greater number of state-owned media tends to result in a lower level of
freedom of press, which is represented by a higher number of jailed journalists and
a greater number of media closed by the government (Djankov et al., 2003).
Moreover, heavy internet restrictions and censorship can be found in countries with
a substantial number of state-owned media, such as China, Iran, and Venezuela,
which casts doubts on the premise of the public interest theory that state-owned
media serve benevolent purposes (Djankov et al., 2003). Additionally, state-owned
media are more likely to reshape global communication that favors the state by
expanding its soft power. Nye (2006) defines soft power as the key to success in
world politics and demonstrates that politics becomes a race for legitimacy,
awareness, and credibility after digitalization vanishes national boundaries. The
ability to spread stories and to convince story recipients is becoming vital to global
power grip; therefore, through the expansion of soft powere, state media would be
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able to justify the legitimacy of totalitarianism, gain international support, and
promote national branding globally.
Originally, the information revolution in global communication appeared to
be an opportunity for western democracies to gradually liberalize the autocratic
states by broadcasting democratic values through global media, but authoritarian
regimes have turned the table on democracies by imposing domestic censorship and
exploiting the openness of the democratic societies they broadcast to (Walker,
2016). The combination of China’s domestic censorship and international
broadcasting through state-owned media, for instance, has created an alternate
reality domestically and beautified China’s image internationally (Lim & Bergin,
2018).
Empirical Findings and Discussion
State-Owned Media in Global Communication
The rise of China’s soft power in Africa may notably exemplify how stateowned media exploit soft power to influence global communication in economic
and political discourses, which will be introduced in infrastructure, service, and
content sectors. Two types of Chinese media outlets—fully state media and
ostensibly private media—can be found in China’s media presence in Africa. China
Global Television Network (CGTN), the global English-language media outlet
previously known as CCTV-9 and CCTV News, for example, is fully owned by the
Chinese government and was officially launched in 2016 as a propaganda machine
based in Beijing with coverage of more than one hundred countries. In addition,
China Mobile, a Chinese state-owned telecommunication company providing
mobile voice and multimedia services, is also an active presence in Africa, serving
the interest of the state.
Huawei, ZTE, and StarTimes, in comparison, are ostensibly privately
owned and, by definition, pursue profit maximization, although in fact, they all
receive substantial financial support from the Chinese government and may be
obliged to comply with Chinese laws and regulations. According to China Daily
(2014), $163 million was provided to StarTimes, a Chinese electronic and media
company, to expand its businesses in Africa by the Export-Import Bank of China
from 2012 to 2014, and another $60 million loan was approved for further
development in 2014. Additionally, Huawei, a Chinese telecommunicationequipment company providing information and communications technology
infrastructure and smart devices, has received as much as $75 billion from the
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Chinese government to grow from a start-up to one of the world’s largest global
telecom-equipment companies, which presumably results in strong state control
over its business operation (Yap, 2019). Similarly, ZTE, a Chinese technologymanufacturing company specializing in telecommunication, is also propped up as
a leading global company by receiving heavy subsidies from the Chinese
government for its research and development expenditures (Atkinson, 2020). As a
result, despite the fact that Huawei, ZTE, and StarTimes are ostensibly privately
owned, their strong financial ties with the Chinese government and their obligation
to comply with Chinese law have led them to being state-controlled in nature.
In the information technology-infrastructure sector, according to the Center
for International Media Assistance (CIMA), China invested more than $5 billion in
telecommunication infrastructures for dozens of African countries from 2000 to
2013 (Yudico, 2017). Moreover, Chinese telecommunication companies, including
Huawei, ZTE, and China Mobile, have dominated telecommunication
infrastructure and undersea cable all across Africa, fundamentally creating a solid
basis for state-owned media to control the content broadcast in Africa, promote
China’s model, and serve China’s military presence in Djibouti (Yeophantong &
Wang, 2019). The Zambian and Ugandan governments, for instance, contracted
with Huawei to install network surveillance and censorship instruments to monitor
their own citizens as a result of the countries duplicating China’s authoritarian
model (Yudico, 2017). Furthermore, China’s undersea cable in Africa, built by a
state-owned telecommunication company, also enables encrypted data transmission
from Africa to Beijing, serving China’s Djibouti military base. Additionally, in the
media service sector, StarTimes, China’s primary television service provider in
Africa, offered pay-television channels to more than 30 African countries with 10
million subscribers. The economic affordability (only $4 per month) and adequate
quality secured comparative advantages for StarTimes over western television
service providers, allowing Chinese state media to further enhance its capability to
propagate China’s version of stories (Marsh, 2019). Finally, in the content sector,
content broadcast by state-owned media may always rest with the political interests
of the ruling power because of the lack of independent editorial accountability.
State media may therefore be able to redefine the norm of freedom of the press,
induce self-censorship, create an alternate reality, and ultimately justify the
legitimacy of totalitarianism in the international community (Walker, 2016).
Content provided by Chinese state media in Africa, such as CGTN, may therefore
favor Chinese authority and create a positive image of China abroad. Additionally,
even outside of Africa, CGTN has frequently appeared on the public stations of
foreign countries, such as Peru, to disseminate state propaganda abroad, which is
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known as the “borrowed boat” strategy (Cardenal et al., 2017). Hence, although
state-owned media may be economically advantageous over privately owned
media, its economic benefits cannot offset its erosion of political freedom and the
fact that it jeopardizes democratization in global communication.
Privately Owned Media in Global Communication
According to public choice theory, introduced above, privately owned
media play a positive political role in global communication, unlike state-owned
media. First, private media, if free from government intervention, may function as
a watchdog to monitor government officials who are in power and may thereby
render the government more responsible. Consequently, individuals who consume
such media would be well informed in choosing political candidates, selecting
goods, and making investment decisions (Djankov et al., 2003). Moreover, private
media is considered an important component of democracy and an effective way to
promote democracy globally, as it reinforces freedom of the press and preserves
freedom of speech. For instance, The Washington Post, one of the oldest privately
owned newspapers in the United States, uncovered the Watergate scandal, the most
infamous political scandal in the history of the United States. Two exceptional
watchdog journalists from the Washington Post revealed how President Nixon used
federal agents to negligently influence his reelection, and their revelation led
directly to the impeachment and resignation of President Nixon (Schudson, 2004).
It is presumably impossible to uncover presidential wrongdoing without the
involvement of private media.
In addition, Van Belle (1997, cited in Whitten-Woodring, 2009) suggested
that two countries with privately owned media are less likely to enter into military
conflicts with one another because the legitimacy of private media in both countries
facilitates the dissemination of trustworthy information and creates a recognition of
shared values. Private ownership may therefore play a positive role in fostering the
story of multilateral trustworthiness and in maintaining peace at the global level.
Ownership Concentration: Phenomena, Causes, and Consequences
Although privately owned media may positively influence global
communication in the above aspects, the profit-maximizing nature of private media
in the era of digitalization tends to gradually raise social inequality and reduce
information pluralism because of ownership concentration. The emergence of
ownership concentration may be traced back to the early history of all relevant
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industries. Since the 1920s, the global film industry has been dominated by eight
primary companies—Paramount, Warner Bros., 20th Century Fox, Loew’s Inc.,
United Artists, Universal Pictures, RKO, and Columbia—that have controlled the
production and distribution of movies around the globe (Hamelink, 2015). The
concentration issue in the film industry is now even more serious, such that Disney,
with its large scale of acquisition (including 20th Century Fox), accounted for
nearly 40% of the U.S. box office in 2019, whereas its closest rival, Warner Bros.,
accounted for only about 14% of the box office in the same period (Whitten, 2019).
Furthermore, in the global news industry, the production and distribution of
international news has been controlled by the “big four” news agencies—United
Press International, Associated Press, Reuters, and Agence France-Presse—since
the late 19th century (Hamelink, 2015). In addition, the telecommunication
manufacturing industry has also been significantly consolidated since the 1960s,
with 13 telecommunication manufacturers accounting for 90% of international
supply in 1978 and only 5 telecommunication manufacturers accounting for 76%
of the global market in 2019 (Hamelink, 2015; Weissberger, 2020). The above
examples serve as compelling evidence of the unprecedented large scale of media
ownership consolidation. The causes and consequences of ownership concentration
may therefore be worth exploring.
From the economic viewpoint, ownership consolidation may be attributed
to developments in global digitalization, high rates of merger, and the interlocking
interests of companies. The emergence of new technologies seems to reduce the
high fixed costs required to produce and distribute information under conventional
technology and thereby facilitates the establishment of new media outlets to end
the dominance of existing media tycoons, whereas in fact, digitalization reinforces
the dominating capacity of existing media giants. As digitalization allows media
content to be spread and stored online without physical interactions, the marginal
cost of producing additional copies has been reduced to nearly zero, so media
tycoons with large numbers of consumers are more likely to share the first-copy
costs with more individuals than are new entrants, thereby reaching efficient
economies of scale (Goodwin, cited in Brown, 1999). Moreover, in a highly
digitalized world with mass communication, the attractiveness of media content
becomes a key element in gaining investments from advertising agencies, which
are considered the primary source of revenue for media outlets and consequently
decide the fate of media companies. Large global media companies with more
resources may therefore secure the comparative advantages over new entrants of
absorbing investments from advertising corporations by substantially expanding
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investment in production and distribution to ensure a higher level of attractiveness
(Herman & Chomsky, 1994).
The second major reason for ownership concentration is likely to be the high
merger rate. Economically speaking, the survival chances of information
companies, especially in the era of digitalization, appear to be greater if small
businesses become part of large conglomerates, as tremendous investments with
enormous financial risks and advanced mass communication technology are
required to reach a large enough audience for a company to financially survive in
the global communication industry. As a result, the mass communication industry
has a tendency to be consolidated into a handful of dominant media conglomerates
that operate primarily for profits (Herman & Chomsky, 1994).
Given the above analysis, existing global media giants and advertising
corporations exhibit more common interests than anticipated. The communication
industry seemingly enjoys the free market and fair competition, but in fact, the
interests of dominating tycoons are closely intertwined through various
connections, such as joint ventures, joint ownership, joint directorates, and mutual
agreements, in order to exploit monopolistic advantages and profit maximization
(Herman & Chomsky, 1994). For instance, joint directorates can be found between
IBM and Time, and mutual agreements can be seen between IBM and AT&T
(Hamelink, 2015). As main competitors may reach a multilateral consensus
regarding production, supply, sales, distribution, and price through those
interlocking connections, it is safe to conclude that an authentically competitive
market may be absent in the communication industry, which deters new entrants
and exacerbates ownership consolidation.
Now that the phenomena and causes of ownership concentration have been
discussed, attention can now be turned to the discussion, from an egalitarian
perspective, of two primary consequences of ownership concentration: inequalities
in the public sphere and loss of expression diversity. It is reasonable to believe that
when a small group of very wealthy people are in charge of many media
conglomerates, the combination of wealth and power may lead to significant
inequalities in public decision-making and social justice, as unelected wealthy
owners are more likely to prioritize their own interests by controlling the flow of
stories to favor themselves than to hold themselves accountable to society
(Hamelink, 2015). In addition, a high level of media ownership concentration may
result in a unanimous single voice on certain issues and thereby reduce the
pluralism of opinions and information.
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Rupert Murdoch, who is one of the world’s wealthiest and most influential
men and controls 57% of newspapers in Australia, at least four national newspapers
in the United Kingdom, substantial shares in Sky Group worldwide, and several
high-profile U.S. newspapers (including WSJ), for example, undeniably plays a
leading role in global politics, economics, and social issues (BBC, 2011; Evershed,
2020). It has been reported that Murdoch abused his power to gain commercial
benefits by ordering his editors and journalists to run lobbying campaigns to
weaken media ownership regulations and influence political candidates and
government cabinets (Lidberg, 2019). Moreover, his son James Murdoch has
publicly criticized his father’s media outlets for disseminating misinformation
about the ongoing climate-change discussion and for downplaying the severity of
the climate crisis despite overwhelming scientific evidence that favors the urgent
necessity of addressing climate change; this downplaying consequentially deters
mutual consensus on climate change within the Australian government (Waterson,
2020). Additionally, the loss of voice diversity can be evident from the fact that
media controlled by Murdoch spread a single voice supporting the Iraq War in
2003, even though the existence of weapons of mass destruction in Iraq—used as
justification for the Iraq War—was never proven (Waterson, 2020). The above
examples may justify the necessity of addressing the problem of ownership
concentration in private media. Government regulations or laws that set maximum
levels of individual media ownership appear to be indispensable.
Conclusion
Using the political-economy approach, this paper has comprehensively
explained how ownership structures and concentration have influenced global
communication. On the one hand, although state ownership appears to be
economically superior, state-owned media is politically toxic, as it undermines the
universal value of democracy by controlling the flow of stories, serving state
interests, and propagating justification for totalitarianism. On the other hand,
privately owned media tends to play the role of watchdog over governments and
safeguard the world’s peace, although its ownership-concentration problem may
ultimately reduce information pluralism and increase social injustice. Hence, the
transition of state-owned media to privately owned media, along with the mitigation
of the ownership-concentration problem through legislation restrictions, is
suggested globally.
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